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Article 5

NOTES
THE PROBLEM OF VENUE IN MULTIPLE DISTRICT LITIGATION
The economic waste involved in duplicating litigation is obvious. Equally
important is its adverse effect upon the prompt and efficient administration
of justice. In view of the constant increase in judicial business in the
federal courts, and the continual necessity of adding to the number of
judges, at the expense of taxpayers, public policy requires us to seek
activity to avoid the waste of judicial time and energy. Courts already
burdened with litigation with which they must of necessity deal should
therefore not be called on to duplicate each other's work in cases involving
the same issues and parties.
Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltime Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1941).

I. The Problem
After departing from a Boston airport, a commercial airliner crashes into
Boston Harbor. As a result of the tragedy, over 150 actions for personal injury
and wrongful death are commenced in several federal district courts.' The
issue of liability in any one case is substantially the same as that in any other.
Its determination will necessitate hearing the same witnesses, and inspection
of the same documents and other evidence. Obviously, chaos could result when
scores of attorneys seek simultaneously to interview the same witnesses or obtain
the same documents. The very suggestion that the same issues be determined
in numerous actions in a multitude of courts, with the further possibility of
conflicting decisions,2 seems repugnant to the most fundamental concepts of
efficient judicial administration. Yet the problem of handling multiple claims
arising out of the same event or occurrence has been one which the federal
judicial machinery has yet to resolve successfully.
While the federal judiciary remains paralyzed in this area, transactions
and events which lead to related multi-district litigation recur with increasing
frequency as the activities of the nation's businesses acquire a national character.
Airline and other common carrier accidents producing multiple tort claims will
undoubtedly place heavier burdens on our courts. Recent developments in
the field of products liability' have opened the door for scores of lawsuits in
dozens of districts arising out of a single sale of a faulty drug by a national
manufacturer. 4 An indictment for a violation of the anti-trust laws affecting
sales in a national market may be the occasion for hundreds of private claims
in every judicial district in the country.5 Likewise civil actions arising from
1 See, e.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), a case involving facts quite
similar to those set out in the textual example.
2 The unfairness which can be caused by different results in separate trials of actions
arising from the same accident is illustrated by such cases as Curtis v. Garcia Y Cia, 272 F.2d
235 (3d Cir. 1959).
3 See generally Condon, Developments With Respect to Products Liability, 20 FooD
DRUG Cosm. L.J. 228 (1965); Jaeger, Product Liability: The Constructive Warranty, 39
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 501 (1964).
4 See generally Silliman, Some Problems of Multiple Product Liability Litigation in the
Drug Industry, 20 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 244 (1965).

5 Clayton Act §16, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §16 '(1964), provides
that a final judgment or decree against a defendant in a criminal antitrust action may be used
as prima facie evidence against him in a subsequent civil action.
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violation of the security laws could easily produce related claims of nightmarish
number and distribution.6
Where the multiple actions are all pending in the same district, consolidation of the claims under Rule 42(a), has proved a limited but effective procedure for relieving court and litigant of unnecessary burdens of duplication.
The most bothersome limitation of Rule 42(a) is that it does not authorize
consolidation of cases pending in different districts.8 However, most multiple
claim cases which are likely to arise today will be brought simultaneously in

several districts. Thus, if Rule 42(a) is to operate, the claims must be transferred to one district for subsequent consolidation. This note proposes to deal
with the present treatment of transfer to a single venue as well as proposals to
improve such transfer procedures.
II. Transfer of Venue Under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a)
Section 140 4 (a), the principal change of venue provision of the Judicial
Code, is couched in the following terms: "For the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought."' This
section is an offspring of the judicial doctrine of forum non conveniens, 0 but
has been interpreted as enlarging that rule." It permits transfer of an action to
the forum most convenient for all parties concerned, and has been held applicable
to all civil actions including those for which special venue provisions are made."2
Thus the statute would seem particularly adaptable to the use of defendants
to avoid the burden of defending multiple actions brought in different districts
but arising out of the same occurrence. The Supreme Court has specifically
indicated that 14 04(a) was designed to alleviate the problems inherent in multidistrict litigation. In Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585,'s actions arising
out of the same barge accident were pending both in the district court at Memphis and in the district court at New Orleans. In upholding the transfer of the
6 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§77(k) and (1) (1964), impose criminal
liability for false or misleading omissions in registration statements, prospectuses and other
communications.
7 FED. R. Cw. P. 42(a); for a general treatment of this rule see 5 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE
42.02 (2d ed. 1951).
8 National Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1961); Silver v. Goodman, 234 F.Supp. 415, 416 (D. Conn. 1964).
9 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) (1964).
10 This rule allows a court to dismiss a case even though the case is properly before the
court, where it would be substantially more convenient to try the action in another forum. See
Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 CoLUM. L. REv. 1
(1929).
11 Under the statute, transfer is prescribed as opposed to dismissal under the judicial
doctrine; consequently, under the statute the original action will not be tolled by the statute
of limitations. Also, a lesser degree of inconvenience is required under the statute. Norwood
v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1955); Ex Parte Charles Pfizer & Co., 225 F.2d 720 (5th
Cir. 1955).
12 See, e.g., United States v. National City Lines, 337 U.S. 78 (1949) (civil anti-trust
cases); Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949) (F.E.L.A. cases); Medich v. American Oil Co.,
177 F.Supp. 682 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (admiralty actions); Wookey v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 89
F.Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (Jones Act); Richer v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 80 F.Supp. 971
'(E.D. Mo. 1948) (diversity of citizenship).
13 364 U.S. 19 (1960).

NOTES

New Orleans action to Memphis, the Court observed: "To permit a situation
in which two cases involving precisely the same issues are simultaneously pending
in different District Courts leads to the wastefulness of time, energy and money
that §1404(a) was designed to prevent."' 4 Indeed 1404(a) has been frequently
utilized to make possible consolidation of related claims pending in different
districts where they arose out of the same airline accident," anti-trust violation,'0 patent infringement 7 or other wrong."' However as an instrument for
transferring multi-district litigation to obtain a single venue, 1404(a) is beset
with a number of difficulties. The remainder of this section will attempt to
analyze these difficulties by discussing the specific requirements for a 1404(a)
transfer and by indicating in what manner multi-district cases often run afoul
of these requirements.
A. Where it might have been brought
The most troublesome aspect of a 1404(a) transfer is that the district to
which a case is transferred must be one in which the action could have been
brought originally. Accordingly the three requirements of jurisdiction over
subject matter, jurisdiction over person and proper venue must be met as to
the transferee forum just as if the action had been commenced there."
Considering the question of jurisdiction over subject matter, it is possible,
in a diversity case for example, that the transferee district would not have had
original jurisdiction. To illustrate: where an action is brought by or against a
corporation in one of a number of states in which it is incorporated, the corporation has been considered, for diversity purposes, to be a citizen solely of
that state.2" Thus an action brought by a citizen of Massachusetts against a
corporation which is incorporated both in New York and Massachusetts could
be maintained in federal court in New York, where the corporation would be
regarded as a citizen of New York. The same action, however, could not be
brought in federal court in Massachusetts, since the corporation would be
regarded as a Massachusetts citizen and diversity would be lacking." Similarly
the action could not be transferred from New York to Massachusetts, since
14 Id. at 26.
15 Rodgers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 202 F.Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.Supp. 795 (D. Del. 1959); Cressman v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 158 F.Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Winsor v. United Air Lines, Inc., 153 F.Supp. 244
(E.D.N.Y. 1957).
16 Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co., 240 F.Supp. 121 (W.D.
Mo.), mandamus refused, 343 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1965); Pierce v., Carvel Stores, Inc., 178
F.Supp. 626 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
17 Aircraft Marine Prods., Inc. v. Burndy Eng'r Co., 96 F.Supp. 588 (S.D. Cal. 1951);
Apex Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 87 F.Supp. 533 (S.D. Ohio 1949).
18 AXE-Houghton Fund A, Inc. v. Atlantic Research Corp., 227 F.Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) (sale of securities); Kansas City Shippers Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 182
F.Supp. 42 (W.D. Mo. 1960) (breach of bill of lading); A. S. Dampskibsselskabet Svenbord
v. United States, 116 F.Supp. 603 (E.D. Te. 1953) (ship collision).
19 See generally WRGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §42, at 127-28 (1963).
20 This rule has been carried over from cases decided prior to the enactment of 28 U.S.C.
§1332(c) (1964), which provides that, for diversity purposes, a corporation "shall be deemed
a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business... ." See Hudak v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 238 F.Supp.
790 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Majewski v. New York Central R.R., 227 F.Supp. 950 '(W.D. Mich.
1964).
21 See Seavey v. Boston & M. R.R. Co., 197 F.2d 485 (1st Cir. 1952).
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the action could not have been brought in the latter state originally. 22 This
would be true even if there were numerous related claims pending in Massachusetts and that court was clearly the most convenient forum. 2 The doors of

the federal courts in Massachusetts would be closed to transfer of any diversity
cases brought by Massachusetts citizens.
Similarly, as regards the question of venue, it may not have been possible
to bring action in the proposed transferee district because venue requirements
there could not have been met. To illustrate this point, in an action coming to

a federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, venue is limited to the
districts "where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside." 24 Where the diversity
action involves a corporate party venue is further governed by section 1391 (c)
which provides: "A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which
it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such
judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue
purposes."" Thus, if a diversity action is brought against a corporation in
district A - where the corporation is not "doing business" - venue must lie
on the basis of the plaintiff's residence, that is, the plaintiff must be a resident of
district A. However, if related actions were brought against the same defendant,
but in other districts by residents of those respective districts, they could not be
transferred to district A since venue would not lie with regard to these plaintiffs.
This would be true even if the district were the locality where the action
arose and clearly the most convenient forum for all parties concerned." In
short, if a corporation is not doing business in the district of the most convenient
forum, venue, for transfer purposes under 1404(a) will not lie for cases involving
multi-district plaintiffs. Even if, in the above example, the corporation had
waived its venue privilege and had consented to be sued in district A, transfer
would nevertheless remain impossible. While venue is a personal privilege of
the defendant which may usually be waived at his option, 7 the Supreme Court
has held, in the case of Hoffman v. Blaski,2 that the "where it might have been
brought" requirement of 1404(a) is not satisfied as to venue in the transferee
district where such venue is obtained by the defendant's waiver. Venue must
have been originally obtainable in the transferee district "independently of the
wishes of the defendant....
22
23

24

Lucas v. New York Central R.R., 88 F.Supp. 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
Cf. Silver v. Goodman, 234 F.Supp. 415 (D. Conn. 1964).

28 U.S.C. §1391(a) (1964).

25 28 U.S.C. §1391 (c) (1964). The interpretation of "doing business" for venue purposes
will depend on the facts of each particular case but it is clear that the question is controlled
solely by federal law and not by the law of the state in which the court sits. Steel Motor Serv.,
Inc. v. Zalke, 212 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1954). On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person,
insofar as service of process is concerned, is determined by state law. Arrowsmith v. United
Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963). Thus a corporation may be amenable to process in
a certain district and yet not be doing business for purpose of venue. Rensing v. Turner Aviation Corp., 166 F.Supp. 790 (N.D. Ill. 1958).
26 See Silver v. Goodman, 234 F.Supp. 145 (D. Conn. 1964).
27 Nierbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939).

28 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
29
Id. at 344. The Hoffman rationale is equally applicable to cases involving a federal
question where venue may lie ". . . only in the judicial district where all the defendants reside." 28 U.S.C. §1391(b). Thus a defendant may waive venue and consent to be sued where
he does not reside. However, even if he has done so with regard to suits brought originally in
such a district, he cannot waive venue to allow transfer of cases pending in other districts.

NOTES
The final element to be considered under the "where it might have been
brought" requirement concerns personal jurisdiction." The Court in Hoffman
did not deal specifically with the question of jurisdiction over persons. However,
a leading court of appeals decision had previously held that a case could not
be transferred on the motion of the plaintiff to a district where defendants were
not subject to process. 3 Several district courts have read Hoffman as adopting
this rule and requiring personal jurisdiction in the transferee court as if the
action originally had been brought there, as well as proper venue.3
Under
this reasoning, jurisdiction over person, like venue, could not be waived by the
defendant for purposes of transfer. Thus, it might be possible to commence
actions originally in a district where the defendant is not subject to process,
if defendant consents to suit. However, actions could not be transferred to
such a forum since they could not have been commenced there originally "independently of the wishes of the defendant."
While the limitations imposed on 1404(a) by Hoffman seem to contradict
the purposes of both 1404(a) and venue provisions in general,33 fortunately
they should not affect most major multi-district litigation. With the trend toward
liberal interpretation of corporate venue and service of process rules, 4 most
large corporations which are likely to be involved in mass litigation, probably
will be considered "residents" for both venue and personal jurisdictional purposes
in virtually every federal district in the country.
One additional point which should be noted in this connection is that
transfer will not be precluded on the basis of the "where it might have been
brought" requirement by state law regarding capacity to sue. In the recent case
3
of Van Dusen v. Barrack,"
plaintiffs, as personal representatives of persons killed
in a Massachusetts airplane crash, had brought thirty-seven actions for wrongful death in a Pennsylvania district court. There were more than one hundred
actions arising out of the same crash pending in the District of Massachusetts.
Consequently, defendant's motion for transfer of the Pennsylvania actions to
Massachusetts was granted." On petition for writ of mandamus, the court of
appeals ordered the district court to vacate the transfer order.
The court
reasoned that, since the plaintiffs had not qualified under Massachusetts law
to sue as personal representatives in that state, the actions "could not have been
brought" in Massachusetts. 8 A unanimous Supreme Court reversed, holding
30

See note 25 supra for preliminary discussion of the question of personal jurisdiction.

31 Foster-Millburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950).
32 Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F.Supp. 913, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Ebel v. Spencer Chem. Co., 227 F.Supp., 956, 957-58 (W.D. Mo. 1964); Jozwiak v. Dayton Oil
Co., 200 F.Supp. 300, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
33 The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of venue requirements is "to save
defendants from inconveniences to which they might be subjected if they could be compelled
to answer in any district, or wherever found." General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S.
R.R., 260 U.S. 261, 275 '(1922).
34 See generally BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§80, 179
(Wright ed. 1960).

35 376 U.S. 612 (1964).

36 Popkin v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 204 F.Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
37 Barrack v. Van Dusen, 309 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1962).
38 Id. at 958. FE. R. Civ. P. 17(b) provides that the capacity of one suing or being
sued as a representative "shall be determined by the law of the state in which the district court
is held. .

..

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
that whether the transferee district is one in which the action "might have been
brought" is not to be determined by the laws of the transferee state regarding
capacity to sue but by the federal laws of jurisdiction and venue.3 9 This interpretation, the Court noted, is necessary to the effectiveness of 1404(a) in the
light of practical considerations. Had the contrary rule prevailed, plaintiffs
suing in a representative capacity could defeat most attempts to transfer to a
more convenient forum simply by failing to comply with the representation
requirements of the transferee forum.
As the court stated: "The power to
defeat a transfer to the convenient federal forum should derive from the rights
and privileges conferred by federal law and not from the deliberate conduct of
a party favoring trial in an inconvenient forum."4
B. For the Convenience of the Parties and Witnesses
The cases in which the courts have considered factors of convenience
sufficient or insufficient to justify transfer defy any systematic analysis. As one
district court has stated: "The cases... have been found to be of little precedential value because obviously, 'convenience,' whether of a party or witness,
and the 'interest of justice,' are matters that are peculiar to the circumstances
of each particular case."42 Perhaps the best summary of the relevant factors is
developed by the United States Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert:43
Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of
proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and
the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There
may also be questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if one is
obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair
trial.
Factors of public interest also have place in applying the doctrine.
Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in
congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a
burden that ought not be imposed upon the people of a community which
has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many
persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather
than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report
only. There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity
case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the
case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems
in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself. 44
39 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 624 (1964).
40 Twenty-three states require ancillary appointment of a foreign executor prior to suit.
Another twenty require other preliminary acts. See 17 RuTGERs L. Rzv. 664, 668 n.24 (1963).
41 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 624 (1964).
42 United States v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.Supp. 709, 715 (E.D. Wash., D. Nev.
1962).
43 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
44 Id. at 508-09. Although Gulf Oil, which first enunciated the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, was decided prior to the adoption of 1404(a), the factors which the Court considered relevant there have been held applicable to cases governed by 1404(a). Koehering Co.
v. Hyde Constr. Co., 324 F.2d 295, 296 (5th Cir. 1963).

NOTES
Certain of these and other factors are especially relevant to a discussion
of transfer of multiple litigation cases. It is clear that the plaintiffs privilege
of choosing his forum is to be given considerable weight,45 especially where the
action is in his home forum. 6 The party moving for transfer must show considerations which outweigh the plaintiff's privilege."" Public interests in the
clearing of court dockets,"5 and the acceleration of adjudication 9 have been
held to be relevant factors but have not been considered controlling" Nor is
the convenience of the court given great weight." The fact that plaintiff will
be inconvenienced by having to hire additional counsel or that present counsel
will be inconvenienced will not weigh against transfer.2 However, the financial
status of the parties has been held to be a valid consideration,5" and where transfer would compel the plaintiff to abandon litigation, it will not be ordered. 4
Thus in multiple district litigation, the fact that similar actions are pending in
the transferee district is only one of the many factors which must be considered.55
The decision to transfer must be based on a balancing of the factors of convenience of all the parties and witnesses with due regard to the plaintiff's venue
privilege.
C. The Interests of justice
The reviser's note to 1404(a) -which the Supreme Court has repeatedly
adopted as authoritative in ascertaining the meaning of this section"5 - makes
plain that the interest of justice is a requirement to be met in addition to that
of convenience: the legislative history of the section reveals that, "the new
subsection requires the court to determine that the transfer is necessary for
convenience of the parties and witnesses, and further, that it is in the interest
45 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329, 332 '(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 851 (1950).
46 Robbins Music Corp. v. Alamo Music, Inc., 119 F.Supp. 29, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
47 Molloy v. Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 130 F.Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See Goodman
v. Columbia Steel & Shafting Co., 171 F.Supp. 718, 719 (W.D. Pa. 1959).
48 See AXE Houghton Fund A, Inc. v. Atlantic Research Corp., 227 F.Supp. 521
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Rhoton v. Interstate R.R., 123 F.Supp. 34, 36 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
49 See Koehering Co. v. Hyde Constr. Co., 324 F.2d 295, 296 (5th Cir. 1963); Glenn v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 210 F.Supp. 31, 35 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
50 Clendenin v. United Fruit Co., 214 F.Supp. 137, 141 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Peyser v. General Motors Corp., 158 F.Supp. 526, 530-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Buchanan v. New York Central
R.R., 148 F.Supp. 732, 733 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
51 Keller-Dorian Color Film Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 88 F.Supp. 863, 866-67
(S.D.N.Y. 1949).
It will almost always be the case that the granting of a transfer motion will
52
inconvenience counsel in the transferor district or necessitate engagement of new
counsel. Were this to be accorded much weight in motions of this type section 1404(a)
would be rendered virtually nugatory.
Cressman v. United Air Lines, Inc., 158 F.Supp. 404, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
53 See A. C. Samford, Inc. v. United States, 226 F.Supp. 72, 78 (M.D.Ga. 1963); Van
Dusen v. J. C. Penney Co., 207 F.Supp. 529, 531-36 (D. Ark. 1962).
54 See General Portland Cement Co. v. Perry, 204 F.2d 316, 320 (7th Cir. 1953); Kasper
v. Union Pac. R.R., 97 F.Supp. 275, 276 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
55 See Cressman v. United Airlines, Inc., 158 F.Supp. 404, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Thus
the convenience of a working widow with infant children may well prevail against the convenience of consolidating all litigation arising out of an airline accident. Shindelheim v.
Braniff Airways, Inc., 202 F.Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Bush v. United Airlines, Inc., 148
F.Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
56 E.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 634-35 nn. 30-31 (1964); United States v.
National City Lines, Inc., 337 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1949); Ex Parte Collet, 337 U.S. 55, 68-71
'(1949).
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of justice to do so." 5 The courts have recognized that the "interest of justice"
is a reason "separate and distinct from the convenience of parties and witnesses
as well as a necessary resultant factor from such conveniences.""8 In most cases,
if the convenience of the parties and witnesses will be served by the transfer, it
follows that justice will also be served, but this does not necessarily follow and
where justice would not be served, transfer should not be ordered, irrespective
of convenience.5 9
The principal factor of "justice" with respect to transfer of related cases
should be their propriety for consolidation. While 1404(a) makes possible interdistrict transfer, it offers no solution to the problems inherent in a consolidated
proceeding- i.e., the possibility that the parties might be prejudiced by jury
confusion due to the volume of testimony, exhibits, etc." Thus, where the related
cases present exactly the same issues which can be effectively consolidated, this
factor should weigh heavily in favor of transfer. For example, multiple wrongful
death claims spawned by the same airplane accident will usually present only
one issue of liability to be decided on the basis of a single composit of evidence,
which can properly be appraised by a single jury. If the defendant is found
without fault, no one recovers; if there is a finding of negligence, everyone
recovers. However, in an anti-trust suit there are two factors necessary for
liability: (1) The defendant must have violated the anti-trust laws; (2) The
plaintiff must have suffered damage proximately caused by the conspiracy.6
While the first factor presents only one issue for the determination of the jury,
the second involves issues peculiar to each individual plaintiff. Each plaintiff
will have to show that during the period of its claim it suffered damage which
was proximately caused by the conspiracy. This will require the jury to consider
evidence which applies to some parties but which is completely irrelevant as to
others. As a practical matter, it is evident that consolidation will aid weaker
cases when combined with stronger ones. The possibilities for confusion and
generalization are obvious. This undesirable situation is, of course, not limited
to the anti-trust field; similar situations could arise, for example, in mass product
liability litigation. While the issue of defectiveness of the product might be
common to all parties, individual showings of proximate cause, contributory
negligence, or assumption of risk might be quite relevant to individual recovery.
It might well be impossible to consolidate cases of this type without violating
the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. 2
When the party seeking transfer delays in making his motion, the courts
generally consider this as a factor of "justice" militating against transfer,"
57

28 U.S.C. CONG. SERV. 1853 (1948).
58 Webster-Chicago Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 99 F.Supp. 503, 504
(D. Del. 1951). See also Hokanson v. Helene Curtis Indus., 177 F.Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
59 Cinema Amusements v. Loews, Inc., 85 F.Supp. 319, 326 (D. Del. 1949).
60 Gwathmey v. United States, 215 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1954); Mays v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 35 F.R.D. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1964); American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Fair, Inc., 35 F.R.D.
236 (N.D. Ill.
1963); Note, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 373 (1963); Note, 68 ILv.
L. REv. 1046
(1955).
61 Freedman v. Philadelphia Terminals Auction Co., 301 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 829 (1962).
62 See Gwathmey v. United States, 215 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1954).
63 See Standard v. Stoll Packing Corp., 210 F.Supp. 749 (M.D. Pa. 1962), appeal dismissed, 315 F.2d 626 (3d Cir. 1963); Rhodes v. Barnett, 117 F.Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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the reason being that if the case is transferred it will necessitate bringing in new
counsel who will be unfamiliar with the proceedings which have already been
conducted.6 4 This factor could cause some difficulty in transferring related
cases where one or more are well on their way to trial before the other actions
are brought or before the issues are clearly discernible. However, a few courts
have held that where the delay was not meant to be an obstructing tactic, it
will not prevent consideration of the motion. 5 This seems the better view.6"
D. Which Law Is To Govern?
The decision in Van Dusen v. Barrack 7 not only resolved the question of
state capacity to sue restrictions,68 but also put to rest the long controverted
question of which state law applies in diversity cases transferred under 1404(a) .6
As noted above, there was a possibility in that case of transferring wrongful
death claims from Pennsylvania to Massachusetts for purposes of consolidation.
However, there were two Massachusetts statutes which were adverse to the
Pennsylvania plaintiff: the enactment prohibiting suit by a foreign representative without ancillary appointment, and a $20,000 limitation on recovery for
wrongful death. Although the accident had occurred in Massachusetts, the
plaintiff noted that that state's limitation on damages would not be applied
under Pennsylvania rules for choice of law, since such limitation would be contrary to the Pennsylvania constitutional policy of not limiting damages."0 Hence,
the plaintiff argued that, were the transferee court to apply this limitation, the
transfer would so prejudice the plaintiff's case as to be against the "interest of
justice." The Supreme Court, however, found this apprehension unfounded.
It reasoned that the Erie doctrine 71 did not require the federal courts to apply
mechanically the laws of the state "in which they sit." A change in venue should
not be a change in law, but simply a change in courtrooms. The transferee
court must apply the law which would have been applied had there been no
change in venue."2
The policy of applying the law of the transferor state permits transfers
which might otherwise have been denied on the basis of prejudicial changes
64 Standard v. Stoll Packing Corp., 210 F.Supp. 749, 750 (M.D. Pa. 1962).
65 See Tivoli Realty, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 103 F.Supp. 174, 177 (D. Del.
1951); Anthony v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 103 F.Supp. 56, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
66 Another important factor of justice should be the probability of a fair trial in the transferee district. Yet courts have been reluctant to consider the plaintiff's claim that he will be
less likely to get a substantial verdict in the transferee court or that the jury will be prejudiced.

E.g., Tuck v. Pennsylvania R.R., 122 F.Supp. 527, 529 (E.D. Pa. 1954); Kirk v. Spur Distrib.
Co., 95 F.Supp. 428, 430-31 (D. Del. 1950). One might suspect that a very compelling reason
for many transfer motions, despite talk of convenience, is to avoid the higher damage awards
of metropolitan juries, and it would seem that the factor should be taken into consideration,
especially where many claims are being transferred to another district on defendant's motion.
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376 U.S. 612 (1964); see Recent Cases, 34 U.

CINN.

L. R!v. 91 (1965); Note, 75

YALE L.J. 90 (1965).
68 See text accompanying notes 35-39 supra.
69 For a history of the controversy surrounding this problem, see generally Currie, Change
of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. CH. L. REV. 341 (1960); Currie,
Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CHI. L. Riv. 405 (1955).
70 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 628-29 (1964).
71 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and subsequent cases; see generally
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS
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§§54-60 (1963).

Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 642-43 (1964).
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in law. Ironically, though, this policy creates a number of other obstacles to
transfer. The Supreme Court itself recognized in Van Dusen that the Pennsylvania law with respect to applicability of foreign damage limitations to actions
brought in its courts was unsettled. It noted that "to the extent that Pennsylvania
laws are difficult or unclear and might not defer to Massachusetts laws, it might
be advantageous to retain the actions in Pennsylvania where, the judges possess
a more ready familiarity with local laws.""3 Uncertainty of the law of the transferor forum is a factor which must be considered as bearing on the desirability
of transfer. To illustrate further the difficulties in applying the transferor state's
law, suppose that an action arising out of an airplane crash occurring in Indiana
were brought in a district court in New York and transferred to a district court
in Illinois. The federal judge in Illinois would be in the unenviable position
of having to rule on the interpretation which a federal judge sitting in New
York would give to an Illinois conflict of laws rule regarding the applicability
of the Indiana wrongful death statute to an action brought in New York. This
interpretation, in turn, under the Klaxon rule,7" would have to be made by
reference to the decisions of the New York state courts which might be unclear
on the point. In a multi-litigation situation where cases may be transferred from
any number of federal districts the confusion could be compounded beyond
comprehension.
Finally, the Van Dusen Court also recognized the effect which varying
state laws might have on the ultimate possibility of consolidating related cases:
"Since, however, Pennsylvania laws would govern the trial of the transferred
cases, insofar as those laws may be significantly different from the laws governing the cases already pending in Massachusetts, the feasibility of consolidation
and the benefits therefrom may be substantially altered."7 " In short, in the
one consolidated case the judge would have to apply the law of a number of
states depending on the districts from which the respective actions were transferred. 6
E. Reviewability of Transfer Orders
The purpose of allowing transfer under 1404(a) to the more convenient
forum is to make the judicial process less expensive, more efficient, and, if
73 Id. at 645.
74 Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), wherein it was held that federal courts hearing diversity cases must apply the rules of the state in which it sits when determining questions of conflicts of laws.
75 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 644 (1964).
76 The extent to which state laws can differ regarding liability for substantially the same
occurrence is illustrated by the multitude of cases dealing with products liability. Purchasers
of a defective gas range in Missouri are allowed to recover damages from the manufacturer on
the basis of an implied warranty. Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo.
1963). However, utilizing the same theory a housewife in New York cannot recover for injuries caused by an exploding gas stove. Anderson v. Radio Corp. of America, 33 Misc.2d 806,
221 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. 1961). Lack of privity does not bar recovery in New Jersey where
the injured person is an employee of the purchaser. Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co., 80 N.J.Super. 184, 193 A.2d 275 (1963). However, in Pennsylvania a bottler's implied
warranty of fitness does not extend to a bartender who is injured by an exploding bottle.
Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963). Analogous situations are
found with regard to prenatal injuries, death and survival statutes, and civil liability for criminal acts.
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possible, more prompt. Yet the statute has often been made self-defeating because of lengthy delays occasioned by the availability of ippellate review of
transfer orders. 7 Although it is-settled that af order granting or denying transfer under 1404(a) is interlocutory, and, as such, is not immediately appealable,7 8 district court decisions regarding transfer have been subject to interlocutory review in one of two ways. Where the validity of the transfer is questioned
by the assertion that the transferee district is not one in which the action "might
have been brought," the courts have occasionally certified the question for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.c. §1292(b)." In the ordinary case, however, it is the propriety of the transfer which is questioned, the contention being
that the judge abused his discretion or failed to consider the factors enumerated
in the statute. Review in these cases occasionally has been by means of the
writ of mandamus,"0 although the decisions are by no means in agreement as
to the extent to which this form of review should be made available.8" The
courts generally agree that mandamus should be available where the district
court has made an error of law, such as transferring to an improper forum or considering an impermissible factor in passing on the motion."3 However, the
First Circuit apparently limits its use to review of transfers to a district court
outside of the circuit.8 3 To a greater or lesser degree the courts have recognized
that mandamus is an extraordinary writ to be used only in extraordinary circumstances.8 " However, at least one commentator has noted a trend in Supreme
Court policy towards more liberal general use of the writ of mandamus, and
has suggested that Van Dusen v. Barrack5 may have broadened the utility of
mandamus as a means of interlocutory review."
In any event, the complex procedural snarls of the Van Dusen episode
present a dramatic example of the delay which can result from appellate review
of transfer orders." It -might well be argued that review of transfer rulings,
like most interlocutory orders, should be limited to review on appeal after final

77 For a cogent argument against reviewability of transfer orders see All States Freight,
Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1952).
78 Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329 "(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851 (1950).
79 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) (1964) provides that a district judge may certify an order for
immediate appeal when he is of the opinion that the order "involves a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate
appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation...
80 See, e.g., Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1955).
81 See 1 BARRON & HOLTZOIF, FEDERAL PRACTI E & PROCEDURE §86.7 (Wright ed.

1960).

82 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, Op. cit. supra note 81, §86.7, at 435-40.
83 In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1954). This holding is based on the premise
that mandamus will issue only in aid and protection of "potential appellate jurisdiction to
review the transfer order."
84 See, e.g., H. L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963).

85

376 U.S. 612 (1964).

86

Kitch, Section 1404(a) of The Judicial Code: In the Interest of justice or Injustice,
L.J. 99, 101-131 (1965).
87 The airline crash from which the original action arose occurred on October 4, 1960. At
various stages at least five judicial proceedings have been held regarding transfer of the case,
the most recent being Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. August 10, 1965), where
an informal order was granted, disqualifying Judge Van Dusen from sitting in any further proceedings. As of this writing, the issue of transfer has not yet been finally adjudicated.
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judgment." Viewing the matter realistically however, it is obvious that appellate
courts would be quite unlikely to reverse because of an erroneous transfer order.
Under the "harmless error rule," 9 reversal would probably necessitate a finding
that the transferor court would have reached a different result than that actually

reached by the transferee tribunal. Such a finding is not likely to be made."
Section 1404(a) demands at least the minimal availability of immediate
review to insure against abuse of the statutory procedure. Yet the possibility of
review by mandamus, and its consequential delay even when the petition is

unsuccessful, imposes a serious weakness in the effectiveness of the statute. Petition for mandamus on any one of a number of transferred claims could delay
consolidation, and hence trial, of all. Judicial restraint in the use of the writ

can of course minimize this possibility.
As this brief outline has indicated the utility of 1404(a) as a device for
handling the problems of multi-district litigation suffers from some serious defects.
The limiting statutory language and its even more limiting judicial interpretation continue to narrow the areas in which the procedure can be effectively
utilized. However, for the unfortunate defendant faced with defending a mass
of related claims, it presents at least some hope for consolidation. The section
also indirectly benefits the courts in the form of more economical judicial administration. However, until recently, the implementation of this device depended
solely on the initiative of the parties. There was no procedure by which the
courts themselves could streamline the handling of such claims for their own
benefit. The next section will deal with an innovation recently utilized by the
courts themselves to meet the most perplexing of all multiple litigation problems.
III. Multi-District Coordination
In 1961 some twenty-nine manufacturers of electrical equipment were
convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of conspiracy to fix prices and allocate business. During the following
year more than one thousand, eight hundred civil actions based on section four
of the Clayton Act were brought by purchasers against the convicted manufacturers.9 Although most of the suits were based on the same alleged conspiracy,
they were filed in thirty-three different districts. 92 Because of this latter fact,
there were only limited possibilities of simplifying their handling by usual methods
discussed in the initial portion of this note. On the other hand, as independent
lawsuits their combined impact could seriously disrupt the normal business of
the district courts. It became apparent that nearly all the cases would involve
the production of substantially the same witnesses, documents and other evidence. 9 The waste of money and effort in duplicating investigation, discovery,
88 See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-27 (1940); for a general discussion of the rationale underlying the final judgment rule.
89 28 U.S.C. §2111 (1964) provides that judgment on appeal shall be made ...
without
regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
90 See Kitch, supra note 86, at 117-18.
91 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORTS
OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 95 (1962).
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
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and legal process was inevitable. Thus was presented the greatest dilemma of
mass multi-district litigation in the annals of federal judicial administration.
In an attempt to meet this problem, the Judicial Conference of the United
States created a Subcommittee of the Committee on Pre-Trial Procedure 'to
consider discovery problems arising in multiple litigation with common witnesses
and exhibits.'"4 Thus the conference indicated an intention to investigate the
problem, not only in the context of the situation facing the dictrict courts, but
also on a long range basis aimed at permanent resolution of the multi-district
litigation tangle. The Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation in the
United States District Courts, as this subcommittee came to be known, is composed of eighteen district court judges and is headed by Chief Judge Murrah
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit."5 Meeting with
the district judges in whose courts the eighteen hundred anti-trust cases were
pending, the committee devised a program for coordinating pretrial and discovery procedure."8 A special information center was established in Chicago
to collect and disseminate data concerning the status of all pending cases.
Repetitious depositions of the same witnesses were eliminated by a national
discovery program whereby all lawyers involved in the cases could simultaneously
examine the witnesses.9" Each deposition was made available for use in accordance with Rule 26(d) 9" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by or against
any party who had notice of the taking of the deposition. Likewise the difficulties
of document production were met by setting up a central depository in Chicago
for documents to be produced by the defendants. Plaintiffs were allowed access
The initial
to the documents and were permitted to make copies of them.
stages of this program have steadily taken effect. In 1963, thirty-three of the
electrical cases were terminated, and in 1964 the terminations increased to
435.100
Early in 1965 a new phase of the coordination program was initiated.
After completion of national discovery in relation to a particular product line e.g., transformers - had been completed, a district court in which a number
of cases involving this product line were pending accepted transfers of similar
cases from other districts. While some of these transfers were made on the
motion of the plaintiffs involved," 1 others were made on the transferring court's
94 Ibid.
95 Members of the committee are: Chief Judge Alfred P. Murrah (10th Cir.), Chairman; Chief Judge Sylvester J. Ryan (S.D.N.Y.); Chief Judge-Thomas J. Clary (E.D. Pa.);
Chief Judge Roszel C. Thomsen (D. Md.); Chief Judge William M. Byrne (S.D. Cal.); Chief
Judge Joe E. Estes (N.D. Tex.); Chief Judge William H. Becker '(W.D. Mo.); Judge George
H. Bolt (W.D. Wash.); Judge Edwin A. Robson (N.D. Ill.). Neal & Goldberg, The Electrical
Equipment Cases; Novel Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A.J. 621, 623 (1964).
96 For an informative description of this program and its operation see Neal & Goldberg,
supra note 95.
97 By March, 1964, the examination of more than 185 witnesses had been completed.
DIRECTOR OF THE ADmINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 42 (1964)

(hereinafter cited 1964 REPORT).
98 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d) lists the situations in which depositions may be used in place of
the actual testimony of the witness at trial.
99 Neal & Goldberg, supra note 95, at 626.
100 1964 REPORT 152.
101 See, e.g., I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v. Regan, 348 F.2d 403 (8th Cir. 1965).
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own motion. In two cases the authority of the court to make the transfers in
this manner was challenged.
In the first of these cases, City of Philadelphia v. I-T-E Circuit Breaker
Co, °2 the district court transferred on its own motion seventeen civil actions
pending against I-T-E Circuit Breaker Company to the Northern District of
Illinois for consolidation with similar cases pending in that district. The defendants petitioned for writ of mandamus to reverse the order, contending that
the court's action was unprecedented and did not meet the standards of due
process. 3 They noted that the moving party always had been held to have
the burden of establishing that the case met the statutory standards for transfer.'" Here, although the court actually was the "moving party," the defendant
found itself saddled with the burden of proving a negative - i.e., that the transfer was not convenient - and, moreover, of proving this to a court which had
apparently already concluded that the transfer should be ordered, following a
discussion of the matter with the judges of the transferee court." 5 The defendants also argued that the court had failed to consider the statutory standards
of "convenience of the parties," pointing out that while discovery on the "national" issues in the case had been completed, there still remained certain "local"
Finally they contended that consoliissues which were yet to be resolved.'
dation in these cases, unlike the airline cases, would lead to confusion prejudicial
to the defendants.'
Despite these arguments, the Third Circuit denied the writ of mandamus
without an opinion. 1 8 Since the transfer on the motion of the court was in fact
without precedent, and in light of the defendant's strong arguments, it was indeed
unfortunate that the court did not express the rationale of its decision. Equally
unfortunate is the fact that I-T-E's subsequent petition for a writ of certiorari
was denied. 00
Three days after the Third Circuit denied mandamus in the Philadelphia
case," ' the Eighth Circuit, in I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v. Becker,"' rendered
an opinion denying a similar petition by the same defendants. In Becker, the
district court, on its own initiative, had issued an order to show cause why certain
cases pending in the Western District of Missouri should not be transferred to
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Both parties opposed such a transfer but
the plaintiff moved in the alternative to transfer the case to the Northern District of Illinois; the court granted this motion." In its petition for mandamus,
102 Civil Nos. 29810, 2981"7, 30017, 30821, 30829, 30851, 30868, 30878, 30885, 30890,
30907, 30913, 30936, 30950, 30955, 30958, 30968, E.D. Pa., February 23, 1965.
103 Brief for Petitioners, p. 13, I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v. City of Philadelphia, No.
15,300, 3d Cir., March 26, 1965, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 936 (1965).
104 See text accompanying note 47 supra.
105 Brief for Petitioners, pp. 13-14, I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v. City of Philadelphia, No.
15,300, 3d Cir., March 26, 1965, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 936 (1965).
106 Id. at 19-20.
107 Id. at 23-25. See text accompanying notes 57-62 supra.
108 I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v. City of Philadelphia, No. 15,300, 3d Cir., March 26, 1965,
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 936 (1965).
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I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 381 U.S. 936 (1965).
No. 15,300, 3d Cir., March 26, 1965.
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343 F.2d 361 '(8th Cir. 1965).

112 Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co., 240 F.Supp. 121 (W.D.
Mo. 1965).
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I-T-E argued that the transfer was made upon the court's own motion and
that 1404(a) did not authorize such a procedure. The Eighth Circuit rejected
this argument, stating simply that the transfer in question was made on the
motion of the plaintiffs. However, the court suggested that the Third Circuit
1
case of Swindell-Dressler Corp. v. Dumbauld.
. might contain an "implied
'4
recognition of... authority"
to transfer on the court's motion had this been
the situation before it.
In the Swindell-Dressler case a district judge had found himself in the
awkward position of granting a motion to consolidate a case pending before
him with one which he had previously transferred to another district He transferred the pending case, explaining that the motion for consolidation was the
equivalent of a motion for transfer under 1404(a). Upon petition for a writ
of mandamus, the court specifically rejected this explanation but granted the
writ on the grounds that "no notice, hearing or opportunity to be heard as to
transfer under section 1404(a) was afforded [petitioner] prior to the order of
transfer... ..""
The Eighth Circuit, in the Becker case, viewed the fact that
mandamus was ordered in Swindell on other grounds as in "implied recognition"
of the court's authority to transfer on its own motion.
These three cases are apparently the only authority supporting transfer on
the court's own volition. As appears from the above discussion of the cases, their
precedential value is not persuasive. In Philadelphiathere was no opinion which
might have expressed the rationale of the decision. In Swindell-Dressler the
transfer order was vacated, but on grounds other than the fact that it was transferred on the court's own motion. The Becker court finds this an "implied recognition" of the propriety of such a transfer, but expresses this finding in dicta.
However, despite this scant case support, the judges before whom the electrical
cases are pending have developed an organized program whereby the cases are
to be transferred to seven specific districts for pre-trial and trial according to
the product involved in the cases. For an example, cases involving circuit
breakers are transferred to the Northern District of Illinois while all condenser
cases go to the Southern District of New York."
The transfer program is
administered by the offices of the Coordinating Committee, and through it, all
of the electrical equipment litigation is expected to be concluded by the end
of this year.
To what extent this procedure will be applied to other multiple-district
litigation situations has yet to be determined. It has been utilized to a limited
degree in at least one other context. In a series of cases the Justice Department
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308 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1962).
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343 F.2d at 363.
Swindell-Dressler Co. v. Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267, 273 (1962).

116 The product lines and their respective transferee districts are: circuit breakers (N.D.
Ill.); condensers (S.D.N.Y.); distribution transformers (E.D. Pa.); hydroelectric generators
(W.D. Wash.); insulators (N.D. Cal.); low voltage distribution equipment (W.D. Mo.); network transformers (N.D. Cal.) power switchgear assemblies (N.D. Ill.); power switching
equipment (E.D. Mo.); power transformers (N.D. Cal.); turbine generators (S.D.N.Y.). All
claims in product lines not included above are to be transferred to the Northern District of
Illinois. See Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co., 247 F. Supp. 950, 952
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). In this case, the court cited the Becker and Philadelphia cases as authority
for transferring cases under this program. Apparently this is the first reported district court
case transferring under the program.
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obtained civil judgments against the nation's four largest producers of rock
salt."
As a result, twenty-six damage actions were brought in seven federal
districts."' The judges concerned determined that these cases should be consolidated if possible in the District of Minnesota and the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. Accordingly, at least six cases have been transferred to the District of Minnesota. Another situation presently subject to inter-district consolidation involves the more than twenty treble damage suits brought against six
manufacturers of aluminum cable following antitrust action by the government
in 1964.119 The Coordinating Committee is currently conducting a survey of
court dockets to identify other possible situations requiring inter-district action.
Computer runs are being made of pending cases in the areas of antitrust, patent
infringement, civil actions arising out of violations of the securities laws, and
personal injury cases involving airplane accidents and products liability.
This summary transfer and consolidation raises some rather serious constitutional questions. It is clear that congressional intent in enacting the general
venue statute was to confer a personal privilege upon the defendant.'
In
providing this protection for the defendant when an action is brought outside
of designated boundaries, venue, in effect, limits the court's exercise of power
over the person.Y Hence, it is not within the court's prerogative to extend its
power beyond this limitation."' As one district court has concluded: "Enactment of a venue statute is within the undoubted power of Congress. It is not
within the judicial province to deny that power even though the effect of its
exercise may be to place a burden upon interstate commerce,"' 23 - or, it might
be added, upon the federal judiciary.
The reviser's notes to 1404 (a) make clear that the section is directed toward
the protection of the interests of litigants: "The . . . subsection requires the
court to determine that the transfer is necessary for the convenience of the parties
2
and witnesses, and further, that it is in the interest of justice to do so.""1
,
Thus
the first criterion must be the "convenience of the parties." The limiting character of this standard is indicated by the fact that it is omitted from a similar
statute authorizing transfer of certain admiralty cases "in the discretion of the
court.""' It is doubtful that the problem of multiple litigation was even considered when 1404(a) was enacted, and it is obvious that the statute is wholly
inadequate to meet the situation. There is a pressing need for legislation to
facilitate the handling of these cases, but the policy of the judiciary in extending
117 See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., TRADE REG. REP. par. 45,061 (D. Minn.
1961) (summary and analysis), aff'd, 382 U.S. 44 (1965).
118 The districts involved are: D. Ill.; D. Mass.; D. Minn.; D. Mo.; D. N.J.; E.D. Pa.;
E.D. Wis.
119 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, TRADE REG. REP. par. 45,064 '(E.D. Pa.
1964) (summary and analysis).
120 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1939); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Stone Co., 278 U.S. 177, 179 (1929).
121 It has frequently been held that venue statutes do not limit the jurisdiction of the district courts. See, e.g., Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 260 U.S. 653, 655 (1923). However,
distinguish between jurisdiction as such and the power to exercise that jurisdiction.
122 Cf. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
123 Cooke v. Kilgore Mfg. Co., 105 F.Supp. 733, 738 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
124 28 U.S.C. CONG. Srv. 1853 (1948).
125 41 Stat. 525 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §742 '(1964).
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the present law to fit the convenience of the court, in disregard of the congressional standard of convenience to the parties, approaches judicial legislation.
The difficulties of judicial administration inherent in the multi-district
litigation dilemma and the ineffectiveness of the present machinery for dealing
with the problem have not escaped congressional attention. The following section attempts to analyze the possible efficacy of one proposed legislative remedy.
IV. The Celler Bill
The following bill, proposed as an addition to the Judicial Code, was introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman Celler last May:
To provide for the temporary transfer to a single district for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings of civil actions pending in different districts
which involve one or more common questions of fact, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That chapter 87 of title 28, United
States Code, is amended by inserting therein after section 1406:
"§1407. Multidistrict litigation
"(a) When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact
are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district
for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be
made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section
upon its determination that transfers for such proceedings will promote the
just and efficient conduct of such actions: Provided, however, That no action
shall be so transferred without the consent of the district court in which it is
pending. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before
the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was
transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated: Provided, however,
That the panel may separate any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third.
party claim and remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action
is remanded.
"(b) Such coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings shall be conducted by a judge or judges to whom such actions are assigned by the judicial
panel on multidistrict litigation. For this purpose, upon request of the panel,
a circuit judge or a district judge may be designated and assigned temporarily
for service in the transferee district by the Chief Justice of the United States
or the chief judge of the circuit, as may be required, in accordance with the
provisions of chapter 13 of this title. With the consent of the transferee district
court, such actions may be assigned by the panel to a judge or judges of such
district. The judge or judges to whom such actions are assigned, the members
of the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation, and other circuit and district
judges designated when needed by the panel may exercise the powers of a
district judge in any district for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions
in such coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.
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"(c) Proceedings for the transfer of an action under this section may be
initiated by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation by notice to the parties
in all actions in which transfers for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings are contemplated. Such notice shall specify the manner, time, and place
of the hearing to determine whether the transfer shall be made. The panel's
order of transfer shall be entered in the office of the clerk of the district court
of the transferee district and shall be effective when thus entered. With the order
so filed there shall be filed the consent of the district courts from which the
actions are transferred. The clerk of the transferee district court shall forthwith
transmit a certified copy of such order to the clerk of the district court of the
district from which the action is being 'transferred.
"(d) The judicial panel on multidistrict litigation shall consist of seven
circuit and district judges designated from time to time by the Chief Justice of
the United States, no two of whom shall be from the same circuit. The concurrence of four members shall be necessary to any action by the panel.
"(e) When actions are transferred hereunder, no district court refusing
to consent to transfer of related litigation may make any order for or permit
discovery in conflict with the discovery proceedings in the transferred actions.
"(f) The panel may prescribe rules for the conduct of its business not
inconsistent with Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.""'2
At this point, a discussion of the bill is in order to ascertain its efficaciousness
to remedy the defects inherent in the present machinery for dealing with multidistrict litigation.
The proposed legislation is an outgrowth of the experience of the Coordinating Committee in conducting the national discovery program.'27 In
substance it is a codification (and perhaps legalization) of the procedures conducted by the committee in the electrical cases. The basic difference is that
the legislation provides for actual transfer of the cases while under the discovery
program, the cases were not transferred but remained in the respective districts.
In order to qualify for transfer under the proposed statute, a civil action
must meet three requirements. First, there must be one or more questions of
fact common to the cases pending in the districts. Thus the section is limited
in application to the multi-litigation situation. Transfer of other types of cases
under 1404(a) will not be affected. Secondly, the cases to be transferred must
be pending in more than one district. Therefore the section will have no effect
on existing methods of consolidating cases pending in a single court under
Rule 42. Third, the circumstances must be such that consolidated pre-trial
proceedings will promote the just and efficient conduct of the actions. This
requires the panel to consider not only whether the procedure will expedite the
termination of the cases, but also whether such procedure will be just to the
parties concerned.
Subsection (a) of the bill provides that the action be remanded by the
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panel at or before the completion of pre-trial.12 Consequently, the trial itself
will take place in the district where the action was originally brought, thus avoiding the problems of conflicts of laws, and possible prejudice in the transferee
district. This procedure will also facilitate determination of local issues, such as
injury in antitrust suits, in the respective localities where the events occurred,
while national issues can be fairly well settled in the consolidated pre-trial procedures. Plaintiffs will not be overly inconvenienced or financially burdened by
the transfer since the pre-trial procedure, which will take place at the transferee
district, will not generally require the plaintiff's presence. However, because
separate trials will take place, there remains the problem of conflicting decisions
which could present some rather difficult problems for the appellate courts. The
bill, of course, does not purport to remedy the problem of duplication consequent upon simultaneous, related trials in numerous districts. However, the
handled at pre-trial, thereby expediting
bulk of the litigation may be effectively
1 29
termination of the individual cases.
Since the panel may transfer to any judicial district, the transfer presumably
can be made to the most convenient district whether or not each action "might
have been brought" there. Further, since the transfers are to be made on the
determination that they will "promote the just and efficient conduct of such
actions," the perplexing problems of convenience of parties will be avoided.
Under the proposed statute, the consent of the district court in which the
action is pending is required to effectuate transfer. This, in effect, gives the
district courts veto power with regard to the transfer of actions pending before
them. This discretion may seem superfluous since four of the seven judges on
the judicial panel must consider and approve the transfer. Of course, it might
well be argued that the district judge will be more aware of the local conditions
affecting the particular case which may have become lost in the scramble at the
general hearing. However, the second proviso to subsection (a) allows for
removal of separable claims. Thus, if a case substantially qualifies as one involving "common questions of fact," claims of a peculiarly local nature can
be remanded to the transferor court while the common claims remain consolidated for pretrial.
The fact that a single hearing is to be conducted regarding all .cases to
be transferred will avoid the duplication of hearings in individual districts encountered under 1404(a). It will also prevent the delay caused by attempts
to obtain appellate review of transfer orders by mandamus or otherwise. If
there is to be any review of the transfer order, it will be of the order in toto
and hence will require only one hearing, in one appellate court.
While the proposed section is not a panacea for the solution of all of the
problems of multi-district litigation, it does present a practicable method for
128 The bill provides that the action shall be "transferred" and "remanded" by the panel.
At the risk of indulging in technicalities, it might be questioned whether the panel can actually transfer and remand a case which is pending before the court. The bill might be dearer if
it provided for the transfer to be made by the court at the direction of the panel.
129 See generally the report of the Judicial Conference Study Group on Procedure in Protracted Litigation-Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases
-25 F.R.D. 351 (1960); Kincaid, A judge's Handbook of Pre-Trial Procedure, 17 F.R.D.
439 (1955).
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reducing, at least to some degree, the duplication of effort which is inevitable
under the present procedures. Moreover, it preserves insofar as is practicable
plaintiff's traditional privilege of selecting his forum and of handling his own
case independently of interference by other litigants.
V. Conclusion
The need for more efficient administration of justice increases as the business
activities of the country multiply in both volume and complexity. It is therefore imperative that procedures. be provided to prevent duplication of judicial
effort wherever possible. By far the most serious threat of duplication exists
where identical causes are presented to the courts in separate actions. While
single determination of such issues is most desirable, it must not be achieved
at the expense of the rights of each individual litigant to a fair trial of his case.
At present our courts are sorrowfully ill-equipped to provide for both efficiency
and justice in such. a situation. The bill now pending seems to be at least a
movement toward endowing the courts with the necessary powers to accomplish
this combined task.
Lawrence J. Fleming

